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Abstract—Information flow monitoring has been mostly used
to detect privacy leaks. In a previous work, we showed that they
can also be used to characterize Android malware behaviours
and in the current one we show that these flows can also be used
to detect and identify Android malware. The characterization
consists in computing automatically System Flow Graphs that
describe how a malware disseminates its data in the system. In
the current work, we propose a method that uses these SFG-
based malware profile to detect the execution of Android malware
by monitoring the information flows they cause in the system.
We evaluated our method by monitoring the execution of 39
malware samples and 70 non malicious applications. Our results
show that our approach detected the execution of all the malware
samples and did not raise any false alerts for the 70 non malicious
applications.
Keywords—Malware detection, Malware classification, Android,
Information Flow
I. INTRODUCTION
Android is an operating system mainly made for mobile
devices. Because of its large adoption and the value of data it
may process, it became the target of malicious applications that
try to steal or corrupt data on the device, misuse the system,
etc. The most common technique to detect malware consists
in analysing statically applications and comparing them with a
signature database. A signature can be a simple hash, bytes in a
file, etc. However, such techniques can be easily defeated with
code obfuscation, metamorphism and polymorphism [1]. One
way to avoid that shortcoming is to monitor an application
during its execution thanks to Dynamic Information Flow
Tracking (DIFT).
DIFT consists in monitoring where sensitive data goes
within a given environment at execution time. On Android,
it has often been used to find out if an application is leaking
sensitive data such as contact list, pictures, etc. Such approach
has shown itself helpful but we believe that DIFT has also other
uses. In a previous work [2], we proposed to represent Android
malware through the information flows they induce in the
system. This way a malware is characterized by the damages
it causes in the system independently from its effective code.
This method permits avoiding all possibilities that malware
have to escape static analysis. In this article we push further
this previous work. We propose to use these profiles as
behavioural signature for detecting their execution.
In the rest of the document we present some related works
about information flow monitoring (section II). We detail
how malware profiles are obtained (section III). Last, we
assess the relevance of these profile as behavioral signatures
and experiment an intrusion detection system based on these
signatures (sections IV and V).
II. RELATED WORKS
In [3], Enck et al. present TaintDroid, a modified version
of Android, that dynamically tracks information flows to
detect privacy leaks. Android applications are written in Java
and their code is interpreted by the Dalvik virtual machine.
Thanks to modifications done to the Dalvik virtual machine,
TaintDroid is able to track information flows within Java
applications, across them and between Java applications and
files. Enck et al. evaluated their approach by analysing 30
Android applications and showed that 2 out of 3 were leaking
sensitive data to remote entities. Since its publication, Taint-
Droid has been used in other tools such as Andrubis [4] or
App Fence [5]. Another information flow monitor for Android
is DroidScope [6]. DroidScope is an Android emulated device
that tracks information flows at hardware level. It is not limited
by the type of applications to be monitored like TaintDroid
but cannot be used on real devices since the information flow
tracking is done by the emulator.
In TaintDroid, DroidScope and other similar works, infor-
mation flow analysis has been used to detect privacy leaks.
Such approaches have helped to detect security threats on An-
droid but we believe that information flow analysis have other
uses too. Wüchner et al. have for instance use quantitative data
flow graphs to detect attacks on Windows in [7]. A quantitative
data flow graph describes any information flow between system
objects and the quantity of information exchanged between
these objects during the execution of the system. Based on a
manual analysis of Windows malware samples, they manually
designed QDFGs that represent classes of attacks such as
malware replicating itself, malware probing the system state
by querying the registries, rootkits etc. To detect an attack
on the system, they then compare the QDFG of the system
with the ones they built to describe classes of attacks. They
evaluated their approach by analysing malicious and non-
malicious programs. Their results showed that they were able
to detect 95.65% of the malicious applications that were active
during their analysis (22) and got a false positive rate of
1.65% when analysing non-malicious applications. According
to the authors, this FPR was higher for non-malicious installers
(6.90%).
Similarly, we proposed a method to characterize auto-
matically Android malware based on information flows they
cause at system level [2]. Instead of measuring the quantity
of information exchanged between system objects, we used
DIFT to observe where data belonging to the application under
analysis go in the system. From the observed information
flows, we then constructed a system-wide information flow
graph that we used as a profile of the application. We built the
profiles of 19 malicious applications from 4 malware families
(DroidKungFu1, DroidKungFu2, jSMSHider and BadNews)
and automatically computed from these profiles 4 malware
profiles. A malware profile is also system-wide information
flow graph and is obtained by extracting the common parts
of malicious application profiles. Each malware profile cor-
responds to a different malware and describes the attack it
carried out. In this current work, we push further the work
we did in [2] and propose to use these malware profiles to
detect the execution of Android malware. The next section
explains the environment we use to analyse and the system-
wide information flow graph.
III. BACKGROUND
A. AndroBlare: an information flow monitor
In this work, we use AndroBlare1 to track information
flows on Android. AndroBlare is aware of information flows
occurring between files, processes and sockets. We use An-
droBlare because it has a real system-wide view of information
flows compared to other solutions like TaintDroid which is
limited to applications written in Java. Furthermore, we want
to be able to perform both the analysis and detection on a real
device so monitoring at hardware level was neither a viable
solution. Using a real device instead of an emulator avoids
any change of behaviour based on the environment analysis.
Measurements done in [8] shows that AndroBlare causes an
overhead of 8% on execution time which means that it should
not badly impact the user experience.
Technically speaking, AndroBlare is a kernel module that
uses the hooks provided by the Linux Security Module frame-
work [9] to track information flows. Thanks to these hooks, a
module can intercept and control the syscalls made by user
processes. A syscall is a request sent by a process to the
kernel to interact with the system. Some of these syscalls,
such as read, cause information flows and are intercepted
by AndroBlare to track information flows. Each time an
information flow is observed, AndroBlare updates the taint
associated to the object of which content has been changed
by the observed flow to take into account its new content.
In addition, AndroBlare also logs the observed information
flows in the kernel log. An entry describes an information flow
and contains 5 types of information as shown in figure 1: a
timestamp, a description of the source container, a description
of the destination container and the taint of the information
involved in the observed flow. In our case, there is only one
taint as we only track one type of data. An object is tainted
if it contains data from the application we are analysing. An
information container is described with its type, its name and
its system identifier.
1https://www.blare-ids.org
[1][HONKDROID] FILE MALICIOUS.APK 1 > PROCESS APP 2 > t1u
[3][HONKDROID] PROCESS APP 2 > FILE PAYLOAD 3 > t1u
Fig. 1: Example of AndroBlare log that describes information





Fig. 2: Profile of DroidKungFu1
B. Malware profile: system information flow graph
A system information flow graph is a representation of
the information flows observed by AndroBlare and describes
how some sensitive data are propagated within the system.
Formally, it is a labelled directed graph G “ pV,Eq of which
nodes v P V represent information containers and edges e P E
from a node v1 to a node v2 represent an information flow from
v1 to v2. Each node has three attributes: its system id, its name
and its type (process, file or sockets). These three attributes
are respectively denoted v.id, v.name and v.type. An edge
has two attributes identified as e.flow and e.timestamp.
e.flow is a collection of information identifiers involved in
the flow corresponding to e. The attribute e.timestamp is
a list of timestamps at which AndroBlare observed the flow
corresponding to e. A graph is automatically built from an
AndroBlare log.
In our previous work [2], we used these graphs as appli-
cation profiles and malware profiles. Such profiles describe
how an application or a malware propagates its data within
the system. An application profile is built from an AndroBlare
log whereas a malware profile is extracted from application
profiles. Figure 2 shows the profile of DroidKungFu1 that
was automatically extracted from the profiles of 5 applications
infected with this malware. It describes the installation of two
applications on the device and the flow corresponding to a root
exploit. We believe that applications belonging to the same
malware family have a common behaviour. We showed that
by extracting malware profiles from the malicious application
profiles. In this work, we extend this point of view by using
these malware profiles to detect any applications injected with
a malware for which we have a profile.
IV. DETECTION OF ANDROID MALWARE EXECUTION
To detect an application infected with a known malware, we
look for a match between the information flows involving its
data and the edges of the malware profiles. A known malware
is a malware for which we have computed a profile. The
two following conditions must be fulfilled to consider that
a flow matches an edge. First, the information flow and the
edge must involve the same information. Second, the source
and destination nodes of the edge must describe the source
and destination containers of the flow. If these conditions are
fulfilled, we consider that the analysed application is infected
with the malware of which profile enables us to find the match.
We therefore consider the application as infected with the
malware of which profile enables us to find the match.
Our analysis environment is a Nexus S device running
a modified version of Android 4.0. This modified version
contains a kernel to which we added AndroBlare and tools
related to the manipulation of taints. To analyse an application,
we install it on the device, mark its apk and use it as a
normal user would do. Meanwhile, AndroBlare tracks the
tainted data and logs information flows involving them. We
mark the apk because it contains all the information belonging
to the application when it is installed on the device. After
the analysis, we then feed our detection engine with the
AndroBlare log to detect the execution of known malware.
V. DETECTION EVALUATION
The quality of a detection engine is generally evaluated
by measuring its True Positive Rate and its True Negative
Rate. The TPR corresponds to the percentage of malware
samples detected using our approach and the TNR corresponds
to the percentage of non malicious applications that were
not detected as a malware sample. To compute the TPR, we
analysed 39 malicious applications belonging to one of the
following malware families: DroidKungFu1, DroidKungFu2,
jSMSHider and BadNews. Most of these applications come
from two public datasets of Android malware: Contagio[10]
and Malware Genome Project [11]. The remaining ones, some
samples of BadNews, were manually collected.
DroidKungFu1 [12] and DroidKungFu2 [13] are Android
malware that were discovered in 2011. They exploit vul-
nerabilities of the Android system to get root access and
install other applications on the system. JSMSHider [14] is
also a malware that installs additional applications on the
system. Instead of exploiting vulnerabilities of the system, it
exploited the fact that some system keys used to sign Android
custom ROM were publicily available. It was thus possible
to create “legitimate” applications with system privileges.
BadNews [15] is an Android malware discovered in 2013.
Its behaviour is controlled by a Command and Control server
which was still active during the time of our experiment. Based
on a manual analysis we did on some samples of the malware,
we discovered that the C&C server can ask the malware to
dowload files, install applications, add shortcuts on the main
screen, display notifications and update the address of the C&C
server. In our previous work [2], we automatically computed a
profile for each one of these families and we use in this work
these profiles to detect the execution of applications belonging
to one of these 4 malware families.
To evaluate the TNR of our approach, we analysed 70
of the most downloaded applications from Google Play. We
consider these 70 applications as non malicious because they
raised no alarm when we submitted them to Virus Total [16].
VirusTotal provides a web service that analyses any type files
to find out if it is a malware. Any file submitted on Virus
Total is scanned by 49 anti-virus products. None of the 70
applications we submitted was detected as a malware so it is
safe to say that they are not malicious.
Experiment
To evaluate our approach, we analyse each application
as described in section IV. In addition to that, we also
introduce key events in the system when executing malicious
applications. These events are events that trigger the attack
carried out by the malware. By doing that, we make sure
that the malicious code is executed during our analysis and
it enables us to decide whether our approach really works or
not since our detection approach is based on the fact that we
detect the execution of the malicious code.
The developers of DroidKungFu1 and DroidKungFu2
added a time bomb in their malicious applications. The ap-
plications wait that a predefined amount of time has elapsed
before executing their malicious code. The elapsed time is
computed from a value stored in the shared preferences of the
application. We manually change this value to lure the appli-
cations in executing their malicious code. BadNews samples
wait for a special intent before contacting the C&C server.
We manually send this special intent to the component the
applications that initiates the contact with the server.
Evaluation results
Tables I and II present the results we got using our dataset
of 109 applications. The first column lists the category to
which the applications belong, the second one lists the number
of applications per category, the third one lists the profiles
causing the alerts and the last one lists the number of infor-
mation flows observed during the analysis of each category. In
the case of the malicious applications, the categories are the
malware families and the number of samples are decomposed
in two. The first number is the number of known samples and
the second one is the number of unknown samples. Known
samples are malicious applications that were analysed when
we computed our malware profiles in [2]. Unknown samples
are malicious applications that we did not analyse before.
Our results show that all the malicious applications we
analysed were detected and non-malicious applications did not
raise any alarms. More precisely, almost all malicious applica-
tions were detected with the profile of the malware family to
which they belong except two samples of DroidKungFu1. All
BadNews samples were for instance detected with the profile
of BadNews and 14 samples of DroidKungFu1 out of 16 were
detected with the profile of DroidKungFu1. The two remaining
samples were detected with the profile of DroidKungFu2. The
reason these two samples were detected as DroidKungFu2 is
that we observed during their analysis the same behaviour as
the one described by the profile of DroidKungFu2. We thus
believe that either these samples have been misclassified in
their origin database or classified using criteria different from
ours.
Furthermore, a complete match with the malware profile
was observed for most of the malware samples. A complete
match means that all information flows described by a malware
Malware # Samples Profile
BadNews 5 + 5 BadNews
DroidKungFu1 7 + 7 DroidKungFu1
0 + 2 DroidKungFu2
DroidKungFu2 3 + 3 DroidKungFu2
jSMSHider 4 + 3 jSMSHider
TABLE I: Detection results for the analysis of 39 malicious
applications. TPR: 100%
Category # Samples Profile
Games 48 None
Tools 8 None




TABLE II: Detection results for the analysis of 70 non mali-
cious applications. TNR: 100%
profile were observed during the analysis. An incomplete
match means that only some of them were observed. That was
the case of some samples of DroidKungFu1. The reason is that
only one application was installed instead of two. Therefore
the part of the malware profile describing the installation of
the second application was never observed.
VI. CONCLUSION
To sum up, we presented in this work a method to detect
the execution of Android malware based on the information
flows they cause in the system. Our method is based on the
idea that samples of the same Android malware should have a
common behaviour. We started exploring this idea in a previous
work by characterizing Android malware with the information
flows they cause in the system. We analysed samples of 4
malware families and automatically built 4 malware profiles
such that each profile corresponds to a different malware
family and describes the attack carried out by the malware.
In this work, we pushed further these findings and proposed
a method that uses these profiles as behavioural signatures
to detect the execution of Android malware. We evaluated
our approach by analysing 39 malicious applications and 70
non malicious applications and detected the execution of all
malicious applications without raising any alarms for the non
malicious applications. In other words, using our dataset of
109 applications, we obtained a TPR of 100% and a TNR of
100%, which are better than the results obtained by Wüchner
et al. in [7] using a similar approach on Windows.
Such results may appear astonishing and in the following
we give the reasons why we got them. First, an Android
malware is generally distributed as different repackaged ap-
plications. It means that samples of the same malware have a
common behaviour due to the malicious code they share. As
our malware profiles describe the attacks carried out by mal-
ware, then a sample of a malware should always be detected as
long as its malicious code is executed. Second, our detection
capability is based on the execution of the malicious code. As
our profiles describe the attack, no alarm will be raised unless
the malicious code is executed. In our experiments, we made
sure that it was executed as we introduced some key events.
Therefore, the attack was carried out each time we analysed
a malicious application and our detection engine successfully
detected it.
As written above, the detection capability of our approach
is based on the execution of the malicious code in the malware
samples. In this work, we manually introduced events that
trigger the malicious code to make sure that it was executed
but in a future work we plan on using an automatic approach
to do the triggering.
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